Riad Kahwaji wrote in “Breaking Defense”:

China’s security relations with Middle Eastern countries have improved in recent years, capitalizing on a gap in the domestic defense requirements caused by strict Western export control regimes. And they show no signs of slowing down.

Regional defense experts told Breaking Defense that these ties remain limited for now. However, they warned, that could change down the line, especially if Washington does not firm up the close, binding defense partnerships sought by some of the United States’ Gulf Arab allies.   

The latest manifestation of China’s improved security relations in the region is the joint maritime exercise its navy started on Oct. 20 with the Royal Saudi Naval Forces, off the Saudi eastern coastline. Dubbed Blue Sword 2025, it is the third edition of the two-week-long annual joint exercise for the two countries.

“China is not missing an opportunity to develop security relations with countries in the region,” said Gamal Sultan, a senior fellow at the Al Ahram Center for Strategic Studies and Research in Cairo.

Hussein Ibish, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, told Breaking Defense, “China is interested in gaining a broader strategic foothold in the region,” and one way to do so is through selling defense systems that lead to long-term strategic relations.

Chinese long-endurance and medium-altitude surveillance and attack drones, such as the CH-4 Rainbow and GJ-1 Wing Loong II, were sold to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in different batches between 2010 and 2018, after the US turned down requests from its Arab allies to acquire the MQ-9 drones.

When any of the US’s Arab allies seek a defense technology after Washington rebuffs its request, “China is not hesitating to respond positively to such demands,” Sultan told Breaking Defense.

Selling major defense systems to leading oil-rich countries would provide China with a firm stronghold in the region.

According to Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman of the Gulf Research Center in Riyadh, “the purchase of weapons is not a one-time transaction but the beginning of a long-term relationship. Given that the typical lifespan of major arms systems is around 20-25 years, arms sales establish sustained strategic and technical dependencies between supplier and client.”

President Donald Trump’s administration appears on track to remedy this by announcing on Sept. 15 that it has taken steps to ease restrictions on the sale of its drones to the region in order to bolster competitiveness against other arms exporters, especially China.

Security Guarantees

Middle East security experts argue that the issue for the regional political actors is about more than providing new defense technology or even a longer-term defense relationship. It is about security commitments.

Sultan said, “Even though China is increasing its defense relations in the country, however, this is not coming with security responsibilities for China, which is not willing to bear any responsibilities in defense and security to any of the countries in the region.”

“China lacks the global logistical and operational reach that allows a country to support foreign defense partners on a large scale. Unlike the US, China does not possess the ‘spare military capacity’ necessary to guarantee defense commitments or sustain complex arms ecosystems overseas,” Sager told Breaking Defense. 

Ibish pointed out that “China cannot replace the United States as the fundamental regional security guarantor,” a role that Washington has monopolized for the past half a century.

After the Israeli air strike on the Qatari capital Doha on Sept. 9, the Trump administration moved quickly to control the damage to its credibility among its Arab allies. Trump signed an executive order on Sept. 29, committing the US to the defense of Qatar if it ever comes under aggression.

Some of America’s other Arab allies seek a much more binding defense pact with the US, as noted by Mohammed Baharoon, the Managing Director of the Dubai Public Policy Research Center, who believes the US executive order with Qatar does not have a “long shelf life and it can’t provide NATO-like umbrella.”

Trump’s guarantee to Qatar was not a formal treaty ratified by the US Senate, but Ibish said “ultimately” the US going to have to provide Arab partners like Saudi Arabia and the UAE the same kind of guarantees, and may have to go as far as Senate-ratified treaties, “or they are going to commit themselves to strategic diversification more strongly.”

Chinese Regional Interests

In the meantime, the analysts cautioned that Washington should not underestimate its Arab allies, particularly given Beijing’s established strong foothold in the region, which has been growing over time.

Saudi Arabia’s defense relations with China date back to the late 1980s, when Riyadh purchased DF-3 Chinese ballistic missiles, reportedly with the US consent. In 2007, Saudi Arabia acquired the more advanced DF-21 ballistic missiles, and in 2019, it started a secret program with Beijing to produce ballistic missiles locally.

Sager pointed out that “the most substantial area of military cooperation between the two countries […] remains the strategic missile program, a legacy of the 1970s and one that was originally carried out with US consent. This remains the cornerstone of Saudi Arabia’s strategic deterrence capability linked to Chinese technology.”

However, China does not seem interested at the moment in undermining the current sphere of influence of the US in the Middle East, and according to the experts, its objective is to ensure the continued safe flow of the much-needed oil and gas from the region to its shores. China imports over half of its crude oil from the Middle East.

According to Abdel Moneim Said, chairman of the Board of the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies and Egyptian Senator, “the Chinese currently have pure economic interests in the region, especially the oil, and are happy to see the US spend plenty of resources in ensuring the security of the region and the safety of its waterways that allow the flow of oil from the region and Chinese products to the Middle East.”

Ibish said that “China’s interest is to allow the US to ensure the free flow of navigation through the Gulf, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.”

“At the same time, however, China will be looking for new opportunities to slowly build up its strategic presence in the region and ties to US regional partners. This will be a very long-term project, and one day, I hope that the rest of the world will barely notice or care about it,” he said.